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The Role of Finance
1 BUYING DEFENSE
WE HAVE emphasized that it is not money, but men, materials,
and machines that constitute the sinews of war. We have seen
that these sinews can be provided in part by expanding total
production, in part by letting inventories and plants run
down, in part by diverting the normal flow of savings and
investment to military purposes, and in part by curtailing the
production and consumption of short-lived non-military
goods.' The kinds of civilian goods that must bear most of
the curtailment have been broadly marked out, and we have
considered, though merely in a general way, how the aggre
gate immediate sacrifice must be distributed among citizens.
The methods for accomplishing these changes fall into two
classes. One is direct and detailed governmental prescription,
such as drafting men for the armed forces, rationing and price
fixing of raw materials and finished goods, commandeering
labor and property. The other method is financial, and relies
principally upon money expenditures, money raising, and
market prices for the organization and guidance of economic
activity. In practice, both methods must play important roles.
No country, not even Germany or Russia, uses direct and
detailed governmental prescription exclusively, and no coun-
try would today rely wholly upon finance. The latter method,
however, is the one the United States and nearly all other
countries have used predominantly in peacetime, and it is
likewise the method on which they have mainly relied in pre-
ceding wars.
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Under it, the government 'buys' defense. Using borrowed
funds in considerable measure at the outset, it places large
orders at profitable prices with manufacturers of ships, air-
planes, guns, tanks, army uniforms, etc. These manufacturers,
in turn, by using their own funds more actively, borrowing
more funds from banks and government agencies, and selling
securities in' the capital markets, multiply the workers on
their payrolls and expand their purchases of materials and
parts from a wide array of industries and enterprises. And all
along the line, the new orders tend to encourage an expan-
sion of plant capacity.
A great stimulus to employment and output is an early
result of the enlarged volume of government spending and
the business and consumer spending induced by it. Under
the impetus of the larger wage and other payments, and be-
cause of idle resources, the new output of military goods may
be accompanied at first, as we have seen, by an expansion
rather than a contraction of civilian goods and services. In-
deed, if the military situation permits, the expanded procluc-
tion of non-defense goods in the early stages of the rearma-
ment program may serve to build up stocks in the hands of
the public against the time when radical curtailment may
become necessary. The production of automobiles, electric
refrigerators, houses, and house furnishings during the last
half of 1940andthe first half of '94' was in part of this char-
acter. But, as orders and production for the military program
mount, they begin to compete with civilian goods in one
sector after another for the supplies of various materials,
skilled labor, specialized capital facilities, and managerial ex-
perience. This kind of competition had become conspicuous
in the United States even before the end of 1940 for some
steels, tool- and die-makers, machine tools, and for managerial
experience in aircraft manufacture. By the end of 1941 it had
become a ruling condition in a wide range of basic materials
and manufactures.
When such competition is encountered, 'buying' defenseTHE ROLE OF FINANCE 71
calls for measures that will enable the military demand to
outbid the civilian for scarce resources. The government is in
a position to. add to the funds at its own disposal for this
purpose by taxation, borrowing, and even printing money,
while it may reduce the funds available for private spending
by taxation and borrowing, and by forcing a curtailment of
bank and other credit. Its procurement agencies, with the
long purse of the Treasury behind them, have an obvious
advantage in bidding against most private buyers for goods
and labor. The same is true in only slightly less degree of en-
terprises holding government contracts guaranteeing them
full reimbursement of costs (in addition to a fixed or variable
fee), and of enterprises with profitable subcontracts, and
of those supplying essential materials to producers of military
goods. In this process of bidding, numerous price rises occur.
In many cases these serve the useful functions of curtailing
non-military demand, of facilitating transfers of resources
from civilian to military use, and of stimulating output. Thus,
through favorable prices and profit margins, full utilization
of productive capacity is encouraged and military production
is given a preferential call on economic resources.
For reasons discussed presently, the process outlined above
cannot be relied upon alone to work smoothly, adequately,
and without undesirable repercussions. Hence, as in the
United States today, the direct controls of priorities, ration-
ing, and price fixing may enormously reinforce and supple-
merit the command of the market gained by the government's
superior buying power.
2 LIMITING AND CURTAILING NON-MILITARY SPENDING
The government's spending and the business spending in-
duced by it provide the positive force that elicits, mobilizes,
and diverts resources for defense through the methods of
finance. But this is not the whole story. The other part is the
limitation and curtailment of non-defense spending,. which
speeds diversion by releasing men, materials, and machines72 FISCAL PLANNING FOR TOTAL WAR
from civilian use. This is the primary function of taxation
and borrowing in wartime. It is also the purpose of reduc-
tions in the non-military outlays of the government. Likewise,
it is a major reason for controlling commercial credit expan-
sion. And it is a conspicuous objective of direct rationing.
Other important purposes also are served by these fiscal and
related measures, such as to modify the distribution of sacri-
fices among our population; but curtailment is their primary
function.
Few statesmen or economists understood clearly in the first
World War that the limitation or actual curtailment of pri-
vate spending lies behind the mere raising of funds and is the
fundamental purpose of taxation and borrowing in war
finance. Legislators and Treasury officials everywhere tended
to view the financial task as one of raising funds in the most
immediately expedient manner, regardless of their source.
New excise taxes were levied alike on goods that com-
peted with, and on those that did not compete with, the
war effort, no matter how needless or wasteful was the
curtailment of consumption sometimes involved. If, for ex-
ample, motion picture theatres or opera hOuses are allowed
to operate at all, no additional sacrifice to the war effort is
entailed when they play to full houses rather than to half
empty ones, and the admissions taxes might well be deter-
mined with this in mind. Indeed, the positive encouragement
of additional consumption of goods and services that are in
abundant supply may itself serve to divert private expendi-
tures from scarcer goods. On the other hand, excise taxes
levied on goods and services people regard as necessities, such
as tobacco and coffee, may be adopted not so much to dis-
courage their consumption as to curtail purchases of other
goods, by absorbing funds that would have been spent on
these other goods.
Understanding of what public borrowing meant was espe-
cially faulty. With the aid of a nationwide intensive selling
campaign, Treasury bonds and notes were sold not only toTHE ROLE OF FINANCE 73
individuals and business enterprises that bought them out of
their current gross incomes, but also to banks and to those
who borrowed .from banks to finance these purchases. Many
of the bank loans were soon repaid, for the borrowers were
stimulated to save more in order to repay their debts. N ever-
theless, in the aggregate, about one-third of the government's
total deficit in the two fiscal years 1918 and igig seems to
have been met by an expansion of bank credit brought about
in this manner.2 Treasury securities were also sold to persons
who paid for them by reducing bank balances that would
otherwise have remained idle or by liquidating savings ac-
counts, corporate stocks and bonds, and other assets.
Now, the underlying difficulty with all these sources of
borrowed money, except the first (current grossincome),was
and is precisely that they commonly entailed a far less than
commensurate curtailment in current private spending, in-
cluding investment spending. Savings bank depositors who
withdrew their savings to buy Liberty Bonds could, and in
many cases no doubt did, continue their current spending un-
diminished. Their withdrawal of funds merely forced savings
institutions to pay out free funds that otherwise could have
been invested in Treasury securities, or to liquidate securi-
ties., perhaps Treasury obligations, the sale of which competed
with new Treasury offerings for the funds of savers. Similarly,
Liberty Bond purchasers who procured funds by selling other
assets, such as corporate securities, were not forced to curtail
their current spending. Nor did the sale of such assets usually
increase the aggregate saving of others: it merely absorbed
funds that would have been saved anyhow and that might
otherwise have been invested directly in Treasury obligations.
Likewise private spending was not curtailed when the Treas-
ury sold its securities to commercial banks or to buyers who
borrowed the purchase funds from banks. In both cases, the
securities were paid for by the creation of new bank deposits
rather than by a reduction in the dollar volume of private
spending.74 FISCAL PLANNING FOR TOTAL WAR
At a time when the use of all the readily available produc-
tive resources of the country is demanded bymajor mili-
tary effort, it is not the act of buying a bond or paying a tax
that constitutes the real aid to the government: the real con-
tribution is the curtailment of private spending by the pur-
chaser or taxpayer. itis this curtailment that releases re-
sources for the government's use and that operates to prevent
inflation.
When unemployment of labor and plant capacity is wide-
spread, the need for limiting and curtailing non-defense
spending is negligible. But it becomes urgent long before em-
ployment is 'full'. As previously noted, time is required to
organize unemployed resources and, because various kinds of
resources are not quickly or fully interchangeable, the sur-
pluses in some lines cannot make up for the shortages in oth-
ers. We cannot quickly turn cotton into aluminum or wheat
into steel. Consequently, temporary but resistant 'ceilings' to
the production of various basic materials, tools, machines,
and sub-products are reached considerably before allre-
sources have been put to work.
Meanwhile, civilian demand for such scarce goods, in com-
petition with military demand, naturally mounts with the
rise in the flow of money incomes to individuals and business
enterprises that is generated by the military spending, unless
these larger money incomes are absorbed or otherwise offset
by appropriate measures. An addition to money income is
enjoyed by the worker who leaves the WPA rolls for a job
at regular wages; by the mechanic who gets more in his pay
envelope because of overtime; by families in which wives and
daughters are induced to enter steady employment because
they can easily get regular jobs at good wages; by the corpora-
tion that receives sufficient new orders to add a second or
third shift in the operation of its plant; by the stockholder
who receives bigger dividends; by the retail stores that sell
more goods; by the doctor and dentist whose services are in
greater demand and who collect more on outstanding bills.THE ROLE OF FINANCE 75
These additions to the money incomes of consumers and
business enterprises may represent fully corresponding addi-
ti.ons to the output of real goods and services. But the addi-
tions to output must take the form largely of military goods
on which civilians cannot spend the additions to their money
incomes. If the government does not absorb these additions
by taxation or borrowing, or render them powerless by ra-
tioning, they will be spent chiefly on civilian goods. Of the
two consequences then likely, both are undesirable: either
niore civilian goods will be produced in response to the de-
mand for them, at the expense, in part at least, of our military
needs; or, if the output of civilian goods is limited by direct
government restriction, their prices will tend to rise because
the increase in the money demand for them exceeds the in-
crease in their output. The evils of an inflationary rise in
prices will be discussed presently.
3 SOURCES OF PRICE INFLATION
Before the present conflict, apparently no nation succeeded
in conducting a major modern war without serious price in-
flation; that is, without a pronounced rise in the general level
of prices. The price inflations (and subsequent deflations) in
the United States that accompanied the War of 1812, the
Civil War, and the first World War are portrayed in Chart
2. A great military program not only involves large-scale
spending by the government, but, as we have seen, it also
provides a powerful stimulus to business and consumer spend-
ing: employment is fuller, money incomes are rising, goods
are purchased to avoid expected shortages or price rises, and
sustained business activity is in prospect. At the same time,
the output of non-defense goods tends sooner or later to
slacken materially. An expanding money demand, together
with shrinking supplies of civilian goods, forces prices up.
The immediate cause is simply a greater increase in total dol-
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Howevergreat the government's military outlays, a serious
inflation could not occur if all increases in the government's
spending in excess of the current additions to the total output
of real goods and services were accompanied by correspond-
ing reductions in private spending. While increases in taxa-
tion and in government borrowing from private income do
not always involve equivalent reductions in private spending,
their powerful tendency in this direction Constitutes their
outstanding merit as sources of the government's funds in
periods when substantial increases in output are no longer
readily possible. If these measures, supplemented perhaps by
direct restrictions upon spending, succeeded in sufficiently
reducing private expenditures, substantial changes might con-
tinue in the prices of some goods re'ative to the prices of
other goods, but a violent and irresistible tendency for prices
ingeneral to rise would be unlikely. In short, the effective
cause of wartime inflation is inadequate curtailment of civil-
ian spending.
Monetary Sources of Inflationary Spending
The necessity of curtailing civilian spending has commonly
l)een obscured in the past, and the difficulties of doing so in-
:reased, by the ready availability of three sources of funds for
asimultaneous expansion of both military and civilian
spending:
i.) More active use of currency and bank credit
2) Creation of new money by the government directly or by
the banking system on behalf of the government
Creationof new money for business and consumer spend-
ing through the expansion of bank credit
More Active Use of Currency and Bank Credit
J:n the heightened business activity that accompanies a great
military program, business enterprises and consumers may in-
crease their spending merely by turning over their funds
more rapidly. When this occurs, increases in taxation and the78 FISCAL PLANNING FOR TOTAL WAR
borrowing of savings will achieve less than equal reductions
in private spending. Taxes themselves may be paid, and gov-
ernment securities purchased, with previously accumulated
bank balances rather than with funds derived from current
income. An individual or business enterprise that purchases
government obligations ordinarily acquires securities which
can readily be sold in case of need; the purchaser can there-
fore afford to carry less idle cash for contingencies. A cor-
poration that has been maintaining an average bank balance of
half a million dollars against average monthly purchases of
goods of the same amount may conceivably double its monthly
purchases and sales without raising the average level of its
bank balance. Such possibilities of financing an aggregate
increase in the nation's spending merely by a more rapid
turnover of existing funds are substantial. They give consid-
erable significance to the fact that at the end of April 1942
the aggregate amount of currency in circulation in the United
States (currency outside the Treasury and the Federal Re-
serve Banks) was about $i 1billion, as compared with less
thanbillionat the end of 1929, and that, on December
31, 1941, the aggregate amount of bank deposits, .exclusive
of interbank deposits, approximated $71 billion, as compared
with $55 billion at the end of 1929. If the average rate of
turnover of money and bank deposits were to rise to the rates
that prevailed in 1929, aggregate spending could expand enor-
mously without increasing currency or bank deposits.
On the other hand, a declining rate of activity in the use
of funds was a conspicuous characteristic of the nineteen-
thirties, though it seems to have since been arrested and, tem-
porarily at least, reversed. A sharply enhanced desire for
liquidity has been noticeable on the part of both individuals
and business enterprises (including banks) since the banking
difficulties and the depression of the early 'thirties. About a
third fewer banks were operating in the United States at the
end of 1941, mainly because so many had failed, than ten
years before; and in some communities inadequacy of bank-THE ROLE OF FINANCE 79
ingfacilitieshas led residents to hold considerably larger
amounts of currency than before. The uncertainties and gov-
ernmental restrictions upon purchases arising from the war,
together with the continuing influence of other developments
of the last decade, may conceivably maintain or accentuate
the tendency for a low rate of activity in the use of funds;
although the possibility of an opposite movement must al-
ways be kept in mind. Finally, while a real possibility exists
that a significant degree of inflation may materialize even if
no enlargement takes place in currency and bank deposits,
all the more serious inflations of the past have been conspicu-
ously facilitated by the creation of new money.
Creation of New Money for the Government
An expansion in aggregate spending is enormously facilitated
when the government's funds are obtained by the creation of
new money, either by the government directly or by the
banking system on behalf of the government. During the
Civil War the United States issued some $431millionin paper
money, later known as 'greenbacks', the issue and spending
of which contributed greatly to the marked price inflation of
the Civil War period. A portion of the issuebeen retired,
but some $347 million are still outstanding. At the end of
:L941,thePresident and the Secretary of the Treasury held
latent powers to increase the currency by about $14.5billion
under various acts of Congress passed during and shortly after
the banking crisis of 1933andsubsequently renewed from
i:imeto time.3No use of these powers, which include presi-
dential authority to raise the monetary value of gold and
silver and to issuebillionof paper currency under certain
conditions, is contemplated at this time so far as is known.
During the first World War and since, creation of fresh
money in the United States has commonly taken the form of
•bank credit expansion rather than the printing of paper
money. The fact that most of us are willing to regard the
deposit liabilities of banks to us as our cash, preferring such8o FISCAL PLANNING FOR TOTAL WAR
deposits to lawful currency itself for all except small amounts,
enables the banks, subject to reserve requirements imposed
by law and expediency, to add to the country's effective sup-
ply of money simply by adding to their deposit liabilities.
Accordingly, when the United States Treasury makes a pub-
lic offering of new securities, the banks are ordinarily per-
mitted to subscribe and pay for them merely by crediting the
account of the Treasury with the value of the securities pur-
chased. Funds obtained in this way do not come out of the
accounts of any other customers of the banks or from the
funds of the banks themselves. From time to time, of course,
the Treasury orders certain banks to transfer funds for its
account to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, for dis-
bursement by government check to contractors and other
creditors of the government. But these and other banks are at
the same time receiving from their customers deposits of
similar checks and of other checks based on them. Hence,
even if a particular bank suffers a net loss of funds in the
process, the banks as a whole do not, for the gain in other
banks offsets this loss. In consequence, the sale of its obliga-
tions to commercial banks provides the government with
funds that are not taken away from others but instead con-
stitute net additions to the country's supply of money.4
The same is true of sales of government securities to indi-
viduals and business enterprises that borrow the purchase
funds from commercial banks. In this case also, the funds re-
ceived by the government are newly created by the banks,
and do not represent a commensurate curtailment of spend-
ing by the lenders. As already noted, during the first World
War both in this country and abroad, great public campaigns
were waged to induce people to borrow from the banks in
order to buy government bonds. In part, these campaigns
were the products of a mistaken emphasis upon the raising
of money as such regardless of its source.
However, such campaigns can sometimes induce more real
saving than would otherwise take place. Conducted with in-ROLEOF FINANCE 8i
tensity for brief periods at intervals of six months or more,
they may arouse great enthusiasm and cause many persons to
buy more bonds, with the aid of bank loans, than they would
have bought out of income during the next six months or
year. Thereupon the purchasers might increase their savings
to pay off the debt. It is often observed that many individuals
can bring themselves to save greater sums over a given period
by first going into debt, then saving to repay the debt, than
by the ordinary accumulation of savings. The initial use of
bank credit in these cases to pay for the bonds and thereby
to finance the government's expenditures is inflationary; but
if it induces a greater aggregate saving over a period than
would otherwise take place, its ultimate net effect will be in
the opposite direction.
In various European countries, government securities were
sold in large quantities to central banks as well as to ordinary
commercial banks. Because the use of checking accounts was
far less common than in the United States, much of the credit
expansion took the form of bank note currency issued by the
central banks in payment of checks drawn by the government
against the proceeds of its loans from the central bank.
'Whether or not paper currency is issued by the central bank,
direct borrowing by the government from the latter, such as
is possible in the United States through the sale of Treasury
securities to the twelve Federal Reserve Banks, is capable of
being more inflationary than the sale of government obliga-
tilons to commercial banks because it leads to increases in the
reserves of the latter, thereby promoting credit expansion on
their part.
The creation of new money permits the government to in-
crease its spending without reducing the dollar volume of
private spending. The result, other things being equal; is a net
in the total dollar volume of spending in the country
as a whole. When unemployment is widespread, an increase
ii. government spending brought about in this way may serve
as a useful offset to deficiencies in private spending and may82 FISCAL PLANNING FOR TOTAL WAR
stimulate the latter as well as total production and employ-
ment. But when all the readily available productive resources
are in demand for the military effort, and the quantity of
goods for civilian consumption is necessarily being diminished
rather than increased, the situation is quite different. Then
the extensive creation of fresh money as a method of financ-
ing, unless counteracted by rationing and similar restrictions
upon private spending, tends to bring about a rapid, pro-
nounced, and prolonged advance in general prices—price
inflation.
Bank Credit Expansion for Business Purposes
An expansion in aggregate spending is facilitated not only by
the creation of bank deposits for the use, initially, of the
government, but also by the creation of deposits for business
enterprises and individuals. Whenever banks make additional
loans to their customers or add to their holdings of corporate
and other securities, they create nearly equal additions to
bank deposits. The heightened tempo of business activity
produced by the arms program, coming at a time when the
banks possess substantial reserves of unused lending power,
can stimulate business borrowing on a large scale.
The important role of bank credit expansion for business
purposes in the price inflation of 1916—20 in the United States
is indicated by these figures: during the three years ended
June 30, 1919,commercialbanks added $2.6 billion to their
collateral loans andbillionto their other loans, as well as
$4.4 billion to their holdings of United States government
securities, and about one-third of a billion to miscellaneous
securities.5 The aggregate, $11.3billion,constituted a rise of
more than 50 per cent in their total loans and investments.
During 1920, when the postwar inflation reached its peak, a
further expansion of bank loans to business added nearly
billionof fuel for the inflation.
In part, the growth of business borrowing from banks dur-
ing a military emergency may be merely a preliminary sub-THE ROLE OF FINANCE 83
stitute for government borrowing. The loans finance con-
tractors and their suppliers in the production of war mate-
rials, and are retired when payment is received from the gov-
ernment, the government itself obtaining the funds by the
sale of securities to the banks. Business loans for war work
have been greatly facilitated by an Executive Order issued
March 26, 1942 which authorized the War and Navy Depart-
ments and the Maritime Commission to make loans, advances,
arid commitments, and to guarantee those made by banks and
other financial institutions, for the purpose of financing con-
tractors or others "engaged in any business or operation
which is deemed...tobe necessary, appropriate, or con-
venient for the prosecution of the war".
In further part, however, the growth of bank loans may
reflect the expansion of non-defense enterprises, which are
benefiting from the rising level Of consumer incomes, and an
increase in the loans made to traders and others to finance
enlarged speculative purchases of goods in anticipation of
higher prices. Credit extended for such private purposes may
be used to divert productive resources to non-military uses
and to raise the aggregate dollar volume of spending in the
cDuntry by more than the concurrent increase in the quantity
of non-military goods available, with a consequent inflation-
ary rise in the price level.
In the sphere of installment credit our banking officials
have attacked this danger directly. The severe restrictions
imposed by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System have reduced installment buying markedly. The new
rules, covering personal loans and many consumer durable
goods, require substantial down payments and severely limit
the period during which the credit must be repaid. They
tend to reduce consumer buying directly and to reduce the
volume of bank. credit used to finance the installment sales
cif dealers, as well as the inventories of manufacturers, whole-
salers, and retailers of the articles affected.
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non-essential purposes have been the drastic limitations or
outright prohibitions imposed by the War Production Board
upon the manufacture of numerous products and upon the
accumulation by any business enterprise of inventories of
goods useful in the war effort. The contraction in the bank
credit employed in the restricted lines partly offsets the ex-
pansion of credit in war work; and the prohibition against
unnecessary inventory accumulation, together with the ac-
tions of the Office of Price Administration in imposing ceil-
ings on the prices of nearly all commodities, will tend to
minimize the competitive scramble to build up inventories,
and the expansion of bank credit in connection therewith.
The prompter, more comprehensive, and more effective ap-
plication of these and other direct controls greatly reduces
the danger of an excessive extension of bank credit to business
for non-military purposes, such as occurred in World War I.
Possible Need for Strengthening Reserves and Capital Re-
sources of the Banking System
Were it not for the indefinitely large demands that may i)e
made upon the banking system to aid in financing the war,
the reserve position of American banks would be regarded
as extremely easy, perhaps dangerously so. This easy position
is mainly due to gold imports, approximating billion,
since 1933.6 Although the legal reserve requirements have
been doubled since 1936 in an effort to mop up some of the
redundant reserves and thereby to reduce the danger of a
runaway credit expansion, the excess reserves of the member
banks of the Federal Reserve System on June1942approxi-
mated $2.8 billion, each dollar of which was legally sufficient,
on the average, to support about $5 of additional deposit
liabilities.
Partly in response to their easy reserve positions and partly
because of the expanded demands for business and other
loans, including large amounts to finance defense orders, the
member banks of the Federal Reserve System had created aTHE ROLE OF FINANCE 85
striking increase in credit during the two and three-fourth
between June 30, 1939 and April 4, 1942. Their loans
rose $4.7 billion, or 36 per cent; their holdings of govern-
ment securities, $6.7 billion, or about 48 per cent; and their
total adjusted demand deposits,7 $11 billion, or about 47 per
This easy ability to. expand credit, though dangerous if
misused, is essential during the war emergency, for the gov-
ernment must be assured of flexible access to ample funds. It
may need to anticipate for short periods prospective receipts
f±om taxes, and it must have a means of creating funds equal
tO such current savings as the public prefers to hold in the
form of cash and bank deposits. To assure an ample supply
cf bank credit, action to offset the restrictive influence of two
important factors now operating may be required. One is the
remarkable and continuing rise in the amount of money in
circulation, for this rise drains reserves from the banks. Be-
tween the end of 1939 and the end of 1941, money in circu-
lation rose $3.5 billion to a new high of $ii billion; and in
the first four months of 1942 it rose $6oo million more, with
no sign that the rise would soon stop. The second factor is the
small amount of capital resources held by many banks in re-
lation to their total assets and deposit liabilities. The fact
that their margin of owned resources is so small is deterring
rriany bankers from utilizing their excess reserves freely. To
enable the banks to provide adequate assistance to the govern-
ment in financing the war and to prevent a costly rise in in-
terest rates, probably the reserve position and perhaps also
the capital resources of the banking system will have to be
strengthened. Such strengthening could be achieved in any
one or more of several ways, including the provision of addi-
lional private capital, reductions in the reserve requirements,
i:he provision of additional bank reserves by open market pur-
chases of government securities by the Federal Reserve
Banks, and supply of additional capital by the government.
However, no degree of facility on the part of the banking86 FISCAL PLANNING FOR TOTAL WAR
system in absorbing government securities and in making
loans to business for war work can substitute for a reduction
in civilian spending, if inflation is to be avoided.
4 INFLATION A NET PRODUCT OF DIVERSE INFLUENCES
We have seen that increases in the government's dollar vol-
ume of spending may take place without corresponding re-
ductions in private spending to the extent that:
Taxpayers pay their taxes and investors buy government securi--
ties with previously accumulated bank balances and other funds
rather than from current income; business enterprises and con-
sumers accelerate the rate of their spending by using their cash
and bank balances more actively;
The government's spending takes place from newly created
money which it obtains by (a) printing it; (b) borrowing it from
commercial banks or the Federal Reserve Banks, which create it
by establishing bank deposits in the government's name; (c) bor-
rowing it from individuals and business enterprises that obtain
it by borrowing from commercial banks; and,
Business enterprises and individuals finance increases in their
spending by borrowing from commercial banks.
And we have further seen that when aggregate dollar
spending increases faster than supplies of goods, an inflation-
ary rise in prices tends to be induced.
In contrast to the increase or maintenance of civilian spend-
ing that is facilitated by the use of the foregoing sources of
funds is the limitation or curtailment that tends to be effected
by taxation, the borrowing of current savings, and reductions
in the non-military outlays of the government:
By imposing high taxes on goods that compete directly with the
defense program, the government can make them so expensive as
greatly to discourage their production and purchase, though
leaving the funds that would otherwise have been spent for them
in the hands of consumers.
By increasing taxation broadly, through manufacturers' salesTHE ROLEOF FINANCE 87
taxes, retair sales taxes, or corporate and individual income taxes,
the government may bring about a general curtailment of private
spending, including investment spending.
By borrowing a part of the remaining current income of the
public, including funds destined for the increase and the replace-
inent of capital goods, the government may further reduce private
Epending for consumption and investment purposes, and may
even draw upon the economy's past accumulation of capital.
]3y curtailing its own outlays for roads, bridges, building con-
etc., the government (including here the states and
local governmental units) may directly reduce non-military spend-
ing and release resources for the war.
Although a useful distinction can be drawn, as we have
done, between methods of financing government spending
t:hat characteristically exert an expansionary influence upon
the nation's total spending and those which do not, it must
be applied cautiously. Inflation is not, strictly sp.eaking, the
result of specific methods of governmental finance. It is the
result of an excessive increase, however brought about, in the
aggregate spending, public and private, of the whole nation
-—excessive in relation to the increase in supplies of goods.
Forces besides governmental financing methods affect the
amount of private spending: the mere temper of the times is
one of them; and changes in the volume of private spending
caused by such other factors may offset or accentuate the
effects of expansionary finance by the government. The pub-
).ic, for example, may increase its current savings and yet pre-
fer to hold the increase in the form of additional cash or bank
balances to investing it in government or other securities. In
such circumstances, the sale of an equivalent amount of gov-
ernment obligations to commercial banks and the spending
by the government of the additional bank deposits thereby
created would only offset the diminished spending of the
public, instead of exerting a net expansionary influence. On
the other hand, a balanced governmental budget would not88 FISCAL PLANNING FOR TOTAL WAR
provide a guarantee against inflation under all conditions; an
excessive increase in private spending could bring inflation.,
Finally, as we shall have occasion to note at greater length in
Chapter 6, the restrictive effect of taxation and borrowing
upon private spending varies considerably according to other
circumstances.
5 DISADVANTAGES OF INFLATION
Some of the most serious evils of inflation arise because the
prices of different goods and services increase in different de-
grees and at different speeds. These differences occur not only
in proper response to changes in the relative importance of
different goods and services, but also because of the accom-
panying adventitious alterations in the distribution of in-
comes and in response to such adventitious factors as differ-
ences in market organization, custom, contract periods. The
wholesale prices of raw materials and basic processed goods
tend to rise much faster than the prices of their products,
mainly because of the speculative demand that becomes con-
spicuous in wholesale markets when price advances are ex-
pected. Railroads and other public utilities and enterprises
supplying goods on long term contracts find it difficult or
impossible to raise their prices to keep pace with their costs.
The increase in the cost of living, as well as in other prices,
causes creditors and others receiving fixed incomes, such as
bondholders, annuitants, pensioners, and many salaried per-
sons, to suffer a disproportionate decline in the purchasing
power of their incomes, while debtors, including corporation
stockholders, enjoy a corresponding gain. Likewise, individ-
uals who are paid by commissions based upon selling prices
and those employed in enterprises producing military goods
on a cost-plus basis, as well as many traders and speculators
who reap large windfall profits from the rise in the money
value of their stocks of goods, are enabled to maintain or even
to better their standards of living, at the expense of less for-THE ROLE OF FINANCE 89
tunately situated persons. Chart 3 portrays some of the enor-
mous disparities in the changes in the real income of different
groups of wage earners during the inflationary period 1915—18.
For many business men, money making becomes easy dur-
ing an inflation, and wastes and inefficiencies creep into busi-
ness. The enterprises that enjoy abnormal increases in profits
by reason of the inflationary rise in prices are by no means
likely to be limited to industries producing military goods';
and the rising profits of various non-defense enterprises stim-
ulate them to expand theiruse of labor and materials at the
expense, in varying degree, of the military program.
In consequence of countless inconsistent and disorderly
variations of this character in the price responses of different
goods and services to inflationary developments, distortions
and tensions are created throughout the price structure.
These distortions obstruct the prompt and adequate diver-
sion of resources to the military effort; and, by creating great
inequities in the sacrifices imposed upon different parts of the
population and by disrupting customary price and debtor-
creditor relationships, incite social unrest.
New elements of uncertainty and instability are injected
into all economic relationships. It becomes impossible to
make contracts requiring close calculation for more than a
short time in advance. Planning for the future by government
or business is therefore made enormously more difficult, as
is the planning of personal and family programs of security.
The latter programs commonly lean heavily upon savings
accounts, insurance policies, and other contracts calling for
the payment of fixed sums; when the future purchasing power
of the dollar is a question mark, these fixed sums lose all
precise meaning.
The rise in prices progressively increases the money costs
of the military program. The money cost to the United States
of the first World War, was increased many billions by infla-
tion. To the extent that such money costs are financed by
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inflated money debt is created which, too often in the past,
has had to be serviced and repaid during a period of much
lower prices and incomes. This was the case in the United
States after the first World War. It cannot be said that every
inflation must inevitably be followed by deflation. Neverthe-
less, each great price rise that has accompanied the major
wars of the United States has been followed by a drastic de-
cline, with a resultant sharp increase in the real burden of
public debts contracted during the period of higher prices.
Long term private debts, also, are sometimes substantially
increased during inflations, with highly injurious conse-
quences to the debtors in the event of falling prices in the
ensuing periods. This was notably illustrated by farm mort-
gages in the United States (Chart 4). Farth mortgage indebt-
:HART4
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edness was vastly expanded by speculative purchases of farm
lands during the war and postwar inflation of 19 17—20. The
fall in prices in succeeding years created great difficulties for
the farmers in meeting their interest charges and principal
maturities, difficulties that were accentuated by the dispro-
portionate declines in the prices of farm products as com-
pared with those of other goods. As it happened, American
agriculture was laboring at this time under difficulties inde-
pendent of those directly attributable to inflation and defla-
tion: from the impact of certain important structural changes,
such as the growing competition of countries in the Southern
Hemisphere for the European markets once held securely by
American farmers, and the substitution of automotive for
horse-drawn vehicles in transportation. The effect of the in-
flation and subsequent deflation was therefore to aggravate
difficulties which would have been serious enough in any
case.
Inflationary price rises have a strong tendency to feed upon
themselves. The mere fact that prices have recently been ris-
ing leads to expectations of further rises and induces advance
spending in anticipation of them. As the prices that consti-
tute business costs go up, the prices of finished goods tend to
be raised. Then wage earners are likely to demand wage ad-
vances to cover the higher cost of living. An advance in wages
tends to increase business costs further, and so to bring about
a further rise in prices. Clearly, a spiral ris.e of this character,
once begun, may feed upon itself without any early effective
check.
Under exceptional circumstances, the advance in prices
may proceed so rapidly and so far that a considerable part of
the purchasing power of the monetary unit is lost before
effective measures of control can be instituted. The curren-
cies of France, Belgium, and Italy depreciated 8o per cent or
more before they were stabilized after the first World War.
The German postwar inflation of 1919—24 was so extremeTHE ROLE OF FINANCE 93
that the mark lost virtually all value and had to be replaced
by a new currency unit. The 'Continental' currency issued
during the American Revolution and the Confederate cur-
rency issued during the Civil War suffered a similar fate.
But such extreme cases of inflation are exceptional. More
often, the price advance is slowed by restraint in the use of
inflationary methods by the government, by direct govern-
mental price and other controls, by continuing increases in
the output of goods and services, and by various factors that
operate directly upon business and consumer confidence to
discourage large increases in spending, such as unwelcome
changes in the political outlook. For these reasons, a mod-
erate degree of inflation must not be interpreted as inevitably
heralding an extreme depreciation of the dollar. But the
tendency of inflationary price advances to feed upon them-
selves and sometimes to get out of hand constitutes another
disadvantage of inflationary methods of finance.
6 INFLATION DOES NOT LESSEN THE NEED FOR IMMEDIATE CUR-
TAILMENT
In the light of the oft demonstrated evils of inflation, the
reader may well ask why sane men ever embark upon a course
of action that brings it about. The answer is that inflation is
rarely chosen as a deliberate policy. It is rather the result of
ignorance, drift, practical obstacles to alternative courses, and
political weakness.
Higher taxes impose direct and immediate retrenchment
upon the public, and hence are politically difficult to enact.
Borrowing appears easier because it seems to postpone the
immediate sacrifice. It appears easier still if the loans can
be obtained from banks and others with idle funds whose
lending would involve no curtailment in their current spend-
ing. As we have seen, however, what lies behind the funds
the government must have is command over labor, materials,
and factories. After all the readily usable productive resources94 FISCAL PLANNING FOR TOTAL WAR
have been put to work, the transfer of any given amount of
funds will be inadequate unless accompanied by a commen-
surate curtailment by taxpayers and lenders of their current
spending (including spending for capital goods). If the sums
raised by taxes and loans do not entail a corresponding reduc-
tion in the use of real resources by civilians; if, for example,
the funds come from reductions in idle balances or from new
extensions of bank credit, the government will be forced to
raise enough more money to outbid the public for the real re-
sources it needs. But a greater increase in the nation's aggregate
dollar spending than in its output of real goods and serv-
ices must produce an inflationary rise in prices. Through the
rise in prices, the real purchasing power of the increased
money incomes of civilians tends to be reduced to approxi-
mate equality with the amount of non-defense goods avail-
able. A rise in the cost of living and in other prices takes the
place of non-inflationary measures in bringing about the nec-
essary curtailment of civilian consumption and investment.
Money wages and other prices may be increased again and
again in response to the attempts of various groups to main-
tain or enlarge their real purchasing power in the face of
continued rises in prices; and some groups may indeed suc-
ceed in raising their real incomes at the expense of other
groups—witness Chart 3. But, obviously, no system of price
increases and no method of financing can enable the civilian
population as a whole to maintain its real purchasing power
intact when supplies of civilian goods are being reduced. Ac-
cordingly, inflation caused by an increase in governmental
spending that is not sufficiently offset by a contraction in pri-
vate spending acts in the end no less than taxation to curtail
private consumption and investment. In short, to the extent
that inflationary spending is successful in meeting the govern-
ment's military needs, it requires just as great current sacri-
fices from the public, in terms of physical curtailment of con-
sumption, as non-inflationary measures. In addition, it imposes
other burdens of the kinds described above.TIlE ROLE OF FINANCE 95
7 SOME RISE IN PRICES UNAVOIDABLE AND USEFUL
Some rise in the general level of prices is almost inescapable
in a military emergency because the natural increases in the
prices of some goods are not readily offset by compensating
declines in other prices. Price increases are to be expected for
goods whose real costs are increased, such as those made from
imported materials and those in which a needed expansion
of output can be obtained only by resorting to inferior
sources of supply, such as various minerals. Further, certain
goods become relatively more important than others. If the
general average of prices is to remain stable, all cases of price
increase must be offset by declines in the prices of other
goods. But such factors as custom, trade position, and bar-
gaining power operate to delay or prevent the compensating
declines in other prices.
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Because a rise in money wages and other prices induces
some persons to seek employment who would otherwise re-
main idle and encourages others to work more intensively or
to utilize their properties more fully, a moderate rise in the
general price level tends to stimulate output. It also facilitates
the transfer of productive resources from non-defense to de-
fense purposes because less resistance is encountered to dis-
proportionate price rises for goods needed in defense as com-
pared with those of other goods than would be encountered
if the attempt were made to force resources out of non-
defense uses by price declines. But these useful purposes of a
rise in prices are likely to be amply served by the moderate
rise which seems inevitable in a war emergency for the rea-
sons indicated above.
Those who welcome a substantial measure of inflation, on
the other hand, are often uninformed or misguided. Many
look no further than the customary association of rising prices
with prosperity. That rising prices may be associated with an
unchanging or declining output of real goods during a major
inflation is well illustrated by Charts 5 and 6. Some who rec-
ognize the unfortunate social consequences of inflation never-
theless welcome it as an opportunity for private profit through
their superior knowledge. And some are won over by the
thought that the payment of governmental costs through. is-
sues of new paper money will avoid both the immediate pain
of taxation and the interest cost and principal repayments
involved in borrowing, and by the further thought that the
rise in prices will eliminate much of the real weight of the
previously accumulated public debt. But the history of war-
time inflations teaches us that all such supposed advantages
are purchased at excessive cost.
8 PRICE RISE SINCE THE MIDDLE OF 1941 SUBSTANTIAL
The rise in prices during 1941 was substantial but not alarm-
ing. The cost of living, which rose about 5 per cent betweenCHART 6
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the middle of 1940 and the middle of 1941, rose roughly 10
per cent in the next twelve months, as measured by the index
of the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics. Wholesale
prices, which rose about 12 per cent between the middle of
1940 and the middle of 1941, rose about 15 per cent more in
the next twelve months, as measured by the Bureau's whole-
sale index. The average monthly rise in living costs between
the middle of 1941 and the middle of 1942 was the greatest
since the first World War inflation, when it approximated i .0
per cent in 1916, i.6 per cent in 1917, 1.7 per cent in 1918,
0.4 per cent in the first half and 2.0 per cent in the second
half of 1919, and 1.7 per cent in the first half of 1920.8
Obviously, a rise of i per cent a month in living costs
would become quite serious if long continued. It would be
enough in three years to raise the cost of living 50 per Cent.
But in view of all the factors at work, the price advance in
1941—42, while enough to occasion serious concern about the
steps needed to restrain the rising tendency, should not be
considered proof that a drastic inflation is inevitable. Part of
the rise must be attributed to increases in the real costs of
imported materials and products; and another part to the
speculative anticipation of rising prices, which was natural
under the circumstances and caused both business enterprises
and consumers to buy in advance of need. The most impor-
tant single factor in the rise, moreover, was the great advance
inagriculturalprices, which owed much to the government's
actions in raising the loan values of certain crops for loans to
farmers by the Commodity Credit Corporation, and in pur-
chasing large quantities of other crops for export to Britain,
Russia, and China under the Lend-Lease Act. Governmental
restraints on price advances, on the other hand, and govern-
mental restriction of demand by priorities, allocations, and
rationing were only gradually extended during the period.
Finally, because of the usual lag in federal income tax collec-
tions, a considerable part of the increase in federal revenues
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fbi:payable until the latter part of 1942 and hence did not
exert its full restraining effect upon private spending earlier.
on the other hand, one powerful restraint upon rising
prices that was vigorously operative during much of 1941can
be expected to operate in reverse during the remainder of
the war: an expanding physical output of civilian goods. In
view of the enormous importance of this factor and of the
continued rise to be expected in money incomes, we may
reasonably conclude that the prevention of more than mod-
erate further increases in prices is likely to require far more
in the way of fiscal, as well as direct governmental, controls
during the remainder of the war than was the case in 1941—42.
OnApril28, 1942,PriceAdministrator Leon Henderson
issued a General Maximum Price Regulation which set price
ceilings on nearly all goods and services, at retail as well as
wholesale, equal to the highest prices reached in March i 942.
Sellers were forbidden to receive and buyers to pay higher
prices. Despite the notable exceptions to the order, princi-
pally wages and other compensation for personal services,
prices of raw agricultural products when below the ceilings
provided in the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942,and
prices charged by restaurants, public utilities, and places of
entertainment, the order may be expected to exert a strong
stabilizing influence upon the price level, provided the sur-
plus money incomes of consumers are absorbed by adequate
taxation and borrowing policies. Price ceilings remove some
of itheupwardpressure upon prices by cutting down the in-
centive to forward buying. If the demand at the fixed prices
exceeds supply, those who come first will take up the entire
supply, unless rationing is used to supplement the price ceil-
ings. But if these measures are not accompanied by tax and
borrowing policies that absOrb the surplus money incomes
of consumers, the pressure upon the fixed prices is likely to
bec:ome enormous. Under such circumstances, the administra-
tive difficulties of general price control might well prove un-
manageable. Responding to the pressure of excessive money100 FISCAL PLANNING FOR TOTAL WAR
incomes in relation to the available goods, the price inflation
held in check by statute in the lawful markets would tend
to break out the more violently in 'black' or underground
markets.
NOTES
1 Circumstances are conceivable, though unlikely in the near future, in which
we might also make significant net additions to our supplies of military goods
from abroad: by obtaining these and other goods in exchange for portions
of our gold stock, of our foreign investments, and direct titles to American
property, including equity and debt securities issued by Federal, state, and
local governments and business enterprises.
2 A. G. Hart, E. D. Allen, and others, Paying for Defense (Blakiston,
p.15.
3These powers are summarized in the following table:
Potential Increases in Lawful Money from the Exercise of Monetary Powers
of the President and the Secretary of the Treasury, as of December 3!, 1941
BILLIONS
OF $
1Usethe Stabilization Fund to purchase government securities 2.0
2 Revalue silver bullion in General Fund from cost value to
official monetary value of $1.29anounce and issue silver cer-
tificates and coins therefor a 1.7
Raise monetary value of silver from $1.29to$2.19 an ounce
(the same percentage increase as was made in the case of gold)
and spend the 2.6
4 Reduce the weight of the gold dollar to one-half of its pre-
1934 weight (raise the price of gold from $35to $41.34an
ounce), and spend the profit' a 4.1
Raise the monetary value of silver to $2.59 an ounce (to a ratio
of i6 to 1,withthe weight of the gold dollar as reduced in 4),
and spend theprofit'
Subtotal 1L5
6Issue circulating currency notes under the Emergency Farm
Mortgage Act of b
Total 14.5
Possibilitiesand 5 assume that 2 has been done. Further additions can be
made beyond the amounts noted by acquisitions of silver and gold bullion at
prices below their possible monetary values.
hCirculatingcurrency notes may be issued under the Emergency Farm Mort-
gage Act of 1933ifthe President finds that this is necessary in addition to
certain open-market operations authorized by the Act to be conducted by the
Federal Reserve Banks, or if the Secretary of the Treasury is unable to get
the consent of the Federal Reserve Banks and the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System to such open-market operations; and the notes can beTHE ROLE OF FINANCE 101
issued"only for the purpose of meeting maturing Federal obligations to re-
pay sums borrowed by the United States and for purchasing United States
bonds and other interest-bearing obligations of the United States...
4The ability of the banks to create additional deposits in this fashion is
limited by the requirement of law as well as of custom and expediency that
they maintain cash or equivalent reserves equal to a certain proportion of
their deposit liabilities. Hence, the banks must possess reserves in excess of
the required proportions in order to expand credit. Since the reserve require-
ments are normally only a small or moderate fraction of deposits—they
average about 20 per cent for member banks at present—the banks are able
to :xpand their credit by several times the amount of their surplus reserves.
Within the limits of their credit-expanding power, the funds with which the
banks buy government and other securities need not be taken away from
depositors but constitute net additions to the country's supply of money.
5 From data compiled by the Division of Research and Statistics, Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
6 The $4 billion of monetary gold possessed by the United States at the end
of 1933 was increased in value to $6.8 billion by the upward revision of the
monetary value of gold by the President on January 30, 1934.Theremaining
increase in our gold stocks occurred through new acquisitions at the revised
value.
7Demanddeposits other than 'interbank and U. S. government deposits, less
cash items reported as in the process of collection.
SHart,Allen, and others, op. cit., p. 185.